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Harmonizing All Around the World:                    
Re-evaluating the Copyright and Treaty 
Powers in the Post-Golan Era 
DERRICK WANG
†
 
 
 
All nations sing 
Let’s harmonize all around the world 
—Michael Jackson1 
Ah, détentes! 
Ah, détentes!  
They’re what everybody wants!  
—Stephen Sondheim2 
In Professor Amy Chua’s 2011 memoir Battle Hymn of the Tiger 
Mother, Chua’s pianist daughter Sophia Chua-Rubenfeld recalls 
performing a selection from Sergei Prokofiev’s Romeo and Juliet3 as 
an eighth-grader making her 2007 Carnegie Hall debut: “I said good-
bye to Romeo and Juliet, then released them into the darkness.”4 
What Ms. Chua-Rubenfeld, the daughter of a legal scholar, might not 
have known was the less poetic legal truth—that Romeo and Juliet 
had been recaptured in the United States in 1994 after decades of 
ostensible freedom, and that, as of January 2012, it and many other 
works would remain under copyright there for years to come. 
 
† Senior Editor, Maryland Journal of International Law 2012–2013; A.B., Harvard 
University; M.M., Yale School of Music; J.D., University of Maryland Francis King Carey 
School of Law, May 2013. The author wishes to thank Professor Michael Van Alstine for his 
guidance; Professor Peter Danchin for his support; Professors Robert Suggs, Patricia 
Campbell, and Lawrence Sung for their advice; and the staff of the Maryland Journal of 
International Law for their invaluable assistance with this Comment. 
1. MICHAEL JACKSON, HIStory, on HISTORY: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE, BOOK I (Epic 
Records 1995). 
2. STEPHEN SONDHEIM, Please Hello, in PACIFIC OVERTURES (1976). 
3. SERGEI PROKOFIEV, ROMEO AND JULIET: TEN PIECES FOR PIANO, OP. 75 (1937). 
4. AMY CHUA, BATTLE HYMN OF THE TIGER MOTHER 140 (2011). 
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In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Golan v. Holder
5
 that 
Congress’ enactment of section 514 of the 1994 Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act (URAA)—retroactively granting copyright 
protection to many works previously in the U.S. public domain 
(including “such favorites by the Russian composer Serge [sic] 
Prokofiev as . . . Romeo and Juliet”6) pursuant to Article 18 of the 
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 
(Berne)—neither exceeded Congress’ Copyright Clause power nor 
violated the First Amendment.
7
 By allowing Congress to “remov[e] 
material from the public domain,”8 the Court effectively expanded 
Congress’ power under the Copyright Clause for the second time in 
ten years: in 2003, the Court had held in Eldred v. Ashcroft
9
 that the 
1998 Copyright Term Extension Act
10—which lengthened the term 
of existing and future copyrights by an additional twenty years—
neither exceeded Congress’ Copyright Clause power nor violated the 
First Amendment.
11
 
In both Eldred and Golan, the Court not only deferred to 
legislative authority
12
 but also validated Congress’ presumed 
rationale that the copyright practices of other nations (specifically, 
other signatories to the Berne Convention) warranted the expansion 
of U.S. copyright protection.
13
 This pressure to conform to (or 
“harmonize with”) international standards14 has also manifested itself 
in other recent legislative developments in intellectual property (IP) 
law, such as the Leahy–Smith America Invents Act (AIA).15 In this 
IP climate, characterized by increasing conformity to international 
agreements, the Court’s explicit deference to Congress and validation 
 
5. 132 S. Ct. 873, 889 (2012). 
6. Complaint at 20–21, Golan v. Ashcroft, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D. Colo. 2004) (No. 
01-B-1854). 
7. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 889. 
8. Id. at 906 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
9. 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
10. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 
(1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
11. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 234. 
12. Id. at 208 (“[W]e are not at liberty to second-guess congressional determinations and 
policy judgments of this order, however debatable or arguably unwise they may be.”); 
Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 888 (“[T]he [Copyright] Clause ‘empowers Congress to determine the 
intellectual property regimes that, overall, in that body’s judgment, will serve the ends of the 
Clause.’” (quoting Eldred, 537 U.S. at 222)). 
13. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 205–06, 236 n.11 (2003); Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 889. 
14. See infra Part II. 
15. Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
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of such conformity raises an increasingly relevant question: if 
deemed necessary, can and will Congress use its power under the 
Treaty Clause to change U.S. copyright law further? 
This Comment, using Golan as its touchstone, explores the 
potential application of Congress’ treaty power to U.S. copyright law. 
Part I outlines, with respect to U.S. copyright law, Congress’ 
historical shift from isolationism to harmonization based on 
international agreements and the manifestation of this shift in Golan. 
Part II examines how the recent importance of international copyright 
agreements may implicate the relationship between the copyright and 
treaty powers in the U.S. Constitution. Part III evaluates Professor 
Graeme Dinwoodie’s comprehensive scholarly consideration of the 
relationship between the Copyright and Treaty Powers, analyzing 
how his own test on this issue might be applied in light of Golan. 
I. GOLAN V. HOLDER: BACKGROUND, CASE, AND CONTEXT 
A. Background of Golan: U.S. Copyright Protection of Foreign 
Works 
 
1. The United States and the Berne Convention: From Isolationism 
to Accession (1790–1989) 
Although Golan illustrates the importance the United States 
currently places on granting copyright protection to foreign works, 
this trend toward harmonization is a relatively recent development in 
U.S. copyright law: in fact, for much of its history, the United States 
did not grant copyright protection to foreign works.
16
 The first U.S. 
copyright statute, the Copyright Act of 1790, granted rights to 
“citizens of these United States, or resident[s] therein”17 and 
explicitly disqualified from protection any work “written, printed or 
published” outside U.S. jurisdiction by a non-U.S. citizen.18 Under 
this statute, many works written by foreign authors in foreign lands 
 
16. See generally Barbara Ringer, The Role of the United States in International 
Copyright—Past, Present, and Future, 56 GEO. L.J. 1050 (1968); Hamish Sandison, The 
Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright Convention: The American Experience, 11 
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 89 (1986). 
17. Copyright Act of 1790, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (superseded by Copyright Act of 1909). 
18. Id. § 5, 1 Stat. at 125 (“[N]othing in this act shall be construed to extend to prohibit 
the importation or vending, reprinting or publishing within the United States, of any map, 
chart, book or books, written, printed, or published by any person not a citizen of the United 
States, in foreign parts or places without the jurisdiction of the United States.”). 
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received no copyright protection in the United States—a result that 
British author Charles Dickens called a “monstrous injustice.”19  
By the late nineteenth century, nations other than the United 
States were actively seeking to create a widely applicable 
international copyright treaty, and in 1886, ten countries—Belgium, 
France, Germany, Great Britain, Haiti, Italy, Liberia, Spain, 
Switzerland, and Tunisia—signed the first version of the Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.
20
 The 
Berne Convention established a “universal procedural framework” 
for copyright law and set minimum standards of copyright protection 
that all signatories must provide.
21
 The United States, however, did 
not accede; although it sent a representative to Berne,
22
 it did not 
empower him to sign the Convention.
23
  
Instead, the United States addressed international copyright 
issues through its own International Copyright Act of 1891, which 
extended copyright protection to works by foreign authors not 
residing in the United States.
24
 Such protection, however, was 
granted only if the President proclaimed that the foreigner’s “state or 
nation” satisfied one of two conditions: either the foreign state 
granted copyright protection to U.S. citizens on “substantially the 
same basis as [to] its own citizens,” or the foreign state was a “party 
to an international agreement” that both provided copyright 
reciprocity and was available for the United States to join.
25
 
Moreover, the International Copyright Act imposed, as a general 
prerequisite to copyright, stringent requirements relating not only to 
formalities (such as registration and deposit on or before the day of 
publication) but also to manufacture.
26
 This Manufacturing Clause, 
 
19. See Sandison, supra note 16, at 92 (quoting Letter from Charles Dickens to John 
Foster (Feb. 24, 1842)). 
20. Peter Burger, The Berne Convention: Its History and Its Key Role in the Future, 3 
J.L. & TECH. 1, 15 n.88 (1988). The first version of the Berne Convention was signed by 
these ten countries on September 9, 1886, and the Convention underwent a series of 
revisions over the course of the next century. See infra text accompanying note 29. When 
referencing the Convention, however, this Comment will refer the reader to its most current 
form: Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 102 
Stat. 2853, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Berne Convention].  
21. See Berne Convention, supra note 20; Robert S. Chaloupka, International Aspects of 
Copyright Law, 15 INT’L HR J. 18, 18–19 (2006). 
22. Thorvald Solberg, The International Copyright Union, 36 YALE L.J. 68, 84 (1926). 
23. Sandison, supra note 16, at 101. 
24. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 565, 26 Stat. 1106 (repealed 1909). 
25. Id. § 13. 
26. Id. § 3. 
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whereby every “book, photograph, chromo or lithograph” had to be 
made within the United States to receive U.S. copyright protection,
27
 
severely limited the copyright protection extended to foreigners.
28
 
Through most of the twentieth century, U.S. copyright law 
remained independent of the Berne Convention, which in turn 
underwent revisions in 1896 (Paris), 1908 (Berlin), 1914 (Berne), 
1928 (Rome), 1948 (Brussels), 1967 (Stockholm), and 1971 (Paris).
29
 
The 1908 Berlin revision notably abolished formalities as a 
prerequisite to copyright protection, thus “ma[king] it impossible for 
the United States [which had codified formalities in its copyright 
statute] to join the Berne Union without substantial changes in its 
domestic law.”30 Rather than conform to this abolition of copyright-
related formalities, Congress instead passed the Copyright Act of 
1909, a revised copyright statute that lessened the manufacturing 
requirement but nevertheless “retained . . . rigid notice formalities,” 
thus continuing to render the United States unable to accede to the 
Berne Convention.
31
 Accordingly, under the Copyright Act of 1909, 
many foreign works failed to secure U.S. copyright protection 
because they did not meet the statute’s formality requirements.32 
Similarly, in 1952, rather than further revise its copyright statute to 
conform to the Berne Convention, the United States opted to sign the 
Universal Copyright Convention (UCC), a new multilateral treaty 
designed to be more compatible with existing U.S. copyright law.
33
 
Nevertheless, Congress did eventually pass the Copyright 
Revision Act of 1976, which—by reducing formality requirements 
and extending the term of copyright protection—brought U.S. 
copyright law closer to the Berne Convention standards.
34
 Moreover, 
by the early 1980s, the U.S. government had become politically 
dissatisfied with the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and 
 
27. Id. 
28. See Ringer, supra note 166, at 1057 (“The requirements of the 1891 ‘manufacturing 
clause’ were so rigid that they made the extension of copyright protection to foreigners 
illusory.”). 
29. Berne Convention, supra note 20. 
30. Ringer, supra note 16, at 1057. 
31. Id. at 1058. 
32. See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 878 (2012) (“[T]he Uruguay Round Agreements 
Act . . . grants copyright protection to preexisting works of Berne member countries, 
protected in their country of origin, but lacking protection in the United States . . . [because] 
the author had failed to comply with U.S. statutory formalities . . . .”). 
33. See Sandison, supra note 16, at 99. 
34. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
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Cultural Organization (UNESCO), which happened to administer the 
UCC.
35
 After withdrawing from UNESCO in 1984, the United States 
passed the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988,
36
 making 
it a party to the Berne Convention beginning on March 1, 1989— 
over a hundred years after the Berne Convention was first signed. 
2. Copyright Restoration and the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
Despite acceding to the Berne Convention in 1989, the United 
States still did not fully comply with the Convention, opting instead 
for a “minimalist approach” to implementation that applied “only 
those changes to American copyright law that [were] clearly required 
under the treaty’s provisions.”37 For example, the Berne Convention 
mandates the recognition of “moral rights” whereby an author can 
object to any change in his work that “would be prejudicial to his 
honor or reputation.”38 The United States, however, chose not to 
revise the U.S. copyright statute to conform to the Berne 
Convention’s moral-rights standards, instead claiming that certain of 
its cases and statutes already met moral-rights requirements and 
relying on the weakness and disuse of the Berne Convention’s 
dispute-settlement procedures to avoid any challenges to this claim.
39
 
The United States also initially avoided implementing the 
“copyright restoration” requirement deriving from Article 18 of the 
Berne Convention, which provides as follows: 
(1) This Convention shall apply to all works which, at 
the moment of its coming into force, have not yet 
fallen into the public domain in the country of 
origin through the expiry of the term of 
protection.                                                             
. . . . 
(4)  The preceding provisions shall also apply in the 
case of new accessions to the Union and to cases 
 
35. See Sandison, supra note 16, at 100. 
36. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 
[hereinafter BCIA] (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
37. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 879 (2012) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 7 
(1988)). 
38. Berne Convention, supra note 20, art. 6bis. 
39. See Berne Convention, supra note 20, art. 33; Chaloupka, supra note 21, at 27 n.5; 
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Development and Incorporation of International Norms in the 
Formation of Copyright Law, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 741 (2001). 
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in which protection is extended by the application 
of Article 7 or by the abandonment of 
reservations.
40
 
In other words, according to the Berne Convention, if a work 
originates and is under copyright in a member nation, all other 
member nations must also grant copyright protection to that work as 
long as the copyright persists in the country of origin.
41
 Accordingly, 
if a foreign work had failed to secure or maintain U.S. copyright 
protection before the United States joined the Berne Convention, but 
that same foreign work still enjoyed copyright protection in its 
country of origin when the United States joined the Berne 
Convention, then the United States must grant to that work the U.S. 
copyright protection it previously did not receive.
42
 
After the United States deferred this issue of retroactive 
copyright protection, several other countries questioned this inaction, 
but—as with the moral-rights issue—the Berne Convention’s 
dispute-resolution mechanism was not strong enough to enforce 
compliance in this matter.
43
  
By contrast, upon joining the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
the United States necessarily subjected itself to harsher consequences 
for Berne noncompliance and was thus motivated to implement 
copyright restoration.
44
 In 1994, the United States became party to 
the Marrakesh Agreement, thus concluding the Uruguay Round of 
international negotiations that converted the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) into the WTO.
45
 In so doing, the United 
States also joined the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property (TRIPS),
46
 which in turn requires implementing 
provisions of the Berne Convention such as Article 18 copyright 
restoration.
47
  
 
40. Berne Convention, supra note 20, art. 18 (emphasis added). 
41. See id. 
42. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 878. 
43. For a more detailed discussion, see id. at 879–81. 
44. See infra notes 50–56 and accompanying text. 
45. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, art. 1, Apr. 
15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154. 
46. See id. art. 12 (“[A]ccession shall apply to this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade 
Agreements annexed thereto.”). 
47. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 9(1), 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 
1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 (“Members shall comply with Articles 1 through 21 of the Berne 
Convention (1971) and the Appendix thereto. However, Members shall not have rights or 
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TRIPS had arisen as a catalyst for speedier expansion of 
international copyright law because the Berne Convention “adopt[ed] 
protections as international norms only after consensus was reached” 
and such consensus became increasingly difficult to obtain as the 
number of Berne signatories increased.
48
 Therefore, to expand 
international copyright law more quickly, the United States and other 
developed countries had included the issue of intellectual property in 
the Uruguay Round.
49
 
Nevertheless, rather than be a mere copy of the Berne 
Convention, TRIPS is stricter than the Berne Convention in three 
significant respects.
50
 First, TRIPS requires a higher minimum 
“floor” of protection for intellectual property rights.51 Second, TRIPS 
requires national legislation that effectively enforces those rights.
52
 
Third, TRIPS requires submission of TRIPS-related disputes to the 
WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), whose decisions are 
binding.
53
 Although the Berne Convention has, in the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ), its own international body that enforces 
provisions and resolves disputes, the ICJ has never been compelled to 
discharge these duties; by contrast, violations of TRIPS have resulted 
in judgments by the WTO’s DSB.54 Furthermore, under TRIPS, 
failure to comply with a DSB ruling can result in trade sanctions on 
the noncompliant party.
55
  
Faced with these stronger consequences for noncompliance 
under TRIPS than under the Berne Convention, the United States 
enacted the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), section 514 of 
which amended the U.S. copyright statute (in what are now sections 
104A and 109(a)) to implement copyright restoration.
56
 
In summary, although copyright restoration constitutes a logical 
outgrowth of the Berne Convention’s national-treatment principle, 
 
obligations under this Agreement in respect of the rights conferred under Article 6bis of that 
Convention or of the rights derived therefrom.”). 
48. Chaloupka, supra note 21, at 20.  
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 21. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. Id.  
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. 103–465, § 514, 108 Stat. 4809, 4976–81 
(1994) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 104A (2006)).  
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the United States nevertheless failed to implement copyright 
restoration until it joined the WTO.
57
 
B. Golan v. Holder: The Case 
 
1. Constitutional Context: The Copyright Clause 
Article I, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution enumerates 
Congress’s powers in a list of clauses including the Copyright Clause 
and the Necessary and Proper Clause.
58
 The Copyright Clause 
provides Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science 
[i.e. knowledge] and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.”59 The Necessary and Proper Clause 
provides Congress the power “[t]o make all Laws which shall be 
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing 
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the 
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer 
thereof.”60 The Tenth Amendment describes the limited scope of 
Congress’s power, providing that “[t]he powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, 
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”61 
2. Procedural History 
The plaintiffs in Golan v. Holder
62
 were “orchestra conductors, 
musicians, publishers, and others who formerly enjoyed free access 
to works § 514 removed from the public domain.”63 Led by Lawrence 
Golan, the plaintiffs first sued the U.S. Attorney General in 2001, 
challenging section 514 of the URAA as unconstitutional under both 
the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment.
64
 The district court 
 
57. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Copyright Lawmaking Authority: An (Inter)nationalist 
Perspective on the Treaty Clause, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 355, 358 (2007). 
58. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Clause 8 is commonly called the Copyright and Patent Clause 
because it refers to “Inventions.” This Comment, focusing more narrowly on copyright-
related language, calls it the Copyright Clause. 
59. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
60. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
61. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
62. 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012). 
63. Id. at 878. 
64. See Golan v. Ashcroft, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1218–20 (D. Colo. 2004), motion for 
summary judgment granted sub nom. Golan v. Gonzales, No. Civ. 01–B–1854(BNB), 2005 
WL 914754 (D. Colo. Apr. 20, 2005), aff’d in part, 501 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2007), 
remanded in part to Golan v. Holder, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (D. Colo. 2009), rev’d, 609 F.3d 
1076 (10th Cir. 2010), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012). 
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granted summary judgment against the plaintiffs on both counts.
65
 On 
appeal, however, the Tenth Circuit remanded to the district court the 
issue of whether removing works from the public domain implicated 
the First Amendment.
66
 
On remand, the district court granted summary judgment to the 
plaintiffs, asserting that section 514 was invalid because the 
government’s interests—namely, conforming to the Berne 
Convention, strengthening foreign copyright protection for U.S. 
authors, or compensating foreign authors whose works had 
previously not received U.S. copyright protection—were not 
significant enough to warrant diminishing the U.S. public domain.
67
 
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed, asserting that strengthening 
foreign copyright protection for U.S. authors was a significant 
government interest and that section 514 was sufficiently “narrowly 
tailored to serve [this] interest.”68 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari “to consider petitioners’ 
challenge to [section] 514 under both the Copyright Clause and the 
First Amendment.”69 
3. The Supreme Court’s Decision 
The Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit’s decision, 
holding that section 514 of the URAA violated neither the Copyright 
Clause nor the First Amendment.
70
 First, the Court relied on its 
previous decision in Eldred v. Ashcroft
71—upholding the Copyright 
Term Extension Act (CTEA) that lengthened the duration of existing 
U.S. copyrights by twenty years—to explain that the “limited Times” 
language in the Copyright Clause did not prevent Congress from 
altering the duration of U.S. copyright.
72
 Accordingly, section 514, 
which merely granted copyright protection to certain works for a 
period commensurate with current U.S. copyright law, was not 
invalid.
73
 Second, the history of U.S. intellectual property (IP) law 
showed that Congress had on multiple occasions granted protection 
 
65. Golan, 2005 WL 914754, at *14, *17. 
66. Golan, 501 F.3d at 1196.  
67. Golan, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1172–77. 
68. Golan, 609 F.3d at 1083. 
69. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 884. 
70. See id. at  889. 
71. 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
72. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 884–85 (2012).  
73. Id. 
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to works previously in the U.S. public domain; accordingly, section 
514, which did the same, was not invalid.
74
  
Third, historical legislative and judicial practice demonstrate that 
the stated purpose of the Copyright Clause—to “promote the progress 
of Science [i.e. knowledge]”—can be satisfied by the mere 
dissemination of works.
75
 Accordingly, even though section 514 
applied to preexisting works and thus might not necessarily induce 
the creation of new works, section 514 was not invalid because it 
could “promote Science” by inducing the dissemination of 
preexisting works.
76
 Finally, given that Congressional testimony 
demonstrated that full U.S. participation in the Berne Convention’s 
international copyright regime would “serve the objectives of the 
Copyright Clause,” the Court determined that it “ha[d] no warrant to 
reject the rational judgment Congress made.”77 
With respect to the First Amendment, the Court again relied on 
its decision in Eldred, which held that the CTEA did not violate the 
First Amendment because the copyright-term extension did not 
disturb U.S. copyright law’s two “built-in First Amendment 
accommodations,”78 the idea/expression dichotomy (whereby 
copyright law protects expression, not underlying ideas) and the fair-
use defense (whereby certain uses of copyrighted material do not 
constitute infringement).
79
 Accordingly, because section 514 did not 
disturb these accommodations, section 514 did not violate the First 
Amendment.
80
 Moreover, no historical evidence demonstrates that 
the public domain is inviolable; rather, given that Congress had 
removed works from the U.S. public domain in the past, section 514 
does not offend the First Amendment in granting protection to certain 
works previously in the U.S. public domain.
81
 
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer argued that “the 
Copyright Clause [did] not authorize Congress to enact [section 
 
74. Id. at 885–87. 
75. Id. at 887–89. 
76. Id. at 888–89. 
77. Id. at 889. 
78. Id. at 876 (quoting Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003)). 
79. Id. at 889–91. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 891–93. 
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514]”82 because it induced neither the creation of new works nor the 
dissemination of the works to which section 514 restored copyright.
83
 
II. CONTEXT OF HARMONIZATION: ELDRED, GOLAN, AND THE 
LEAHY–SMITH PATENT REFORM ACT 
By upholding section 514 of the URAA, Golan v. Holder 
represents a further step in the United States’ recent movement 
toward international harmonization of intellectual property law. In 
both Eldred and Golan, the Court not only deferred to legislative 
authority
84
 but also validated Congress’ presumed rationale that the 
copyright practices of other nations (specifically, other signatories to 
the Berne Convention) warranted the expansion of U.S. copyright 
protection.
85
  
For example, the Court in Eldred explicitly validated Congress’ 
desire to keep pace with the European Union (EU) by extending the 
U.S. copyright term by an additional twenty years: 
The CTEA reflects judgments of a kind Congress 
typically makes, judgments we cannot dismiss as 
outside the Legislature’s domain. As respondent 
describes . . . a key factor in the CTEA’s passage was a 
1993 European Union (EU) directive instructing EU 
members to establish a copyright term of life plus 70 
years.
86
  
Moreover, the EU directed its members “to deny this longer term to 
the works of any non-EU country whose laws did not secure the same 
extended term.”87 Thus, by extending the baseline United States 
copyright term to life plus 70 years, Congress sought to ensure that 
 
82. Id. at 900 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
83. See id. at 903 (“[Section 514] withdraws works from the public domain, brings about 
higher prices and costs, and in doing so seriously restricts dissemination, particularly to 
those who need it for scholarly, educational, or cultural purposes—all without providing any 
additional incentive for the production of new material.”). 
84. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 208 (2003) (“[The Court is] not at liberty to 
second-guess congressional determinations and policy judgments of this order, however 
debatable or arguably unwise they may be.”); Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 888 (“[T]he [Copyright] 
Clause ‘empowers Congress to determine the intellectual property regimes that, overall, in 
that body’s judgment, will serve the ends of the Clause.’” (quoting Eldred, 537 U.S. at 222)). 
85. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 205–06, 206 n.11; Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 889. 
86. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 188 (internal citations omitted). 
87. Id. 
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American authors’ works would receive the same copyright 
protection in Europe as their European counterparts did in Europe.
88
 
Global trade issues have also exerted pressure on U.S. legislators 
to conform to international IP standards in areas beyond copyright 
retroactivity. The recent Leahy–Smith America Invents Act (AIA)89 
exemplifies the legislative tendency to adapt U.S. IP law (beyond 
copyright law) to international standards. In this reform of the U.S. 
patent system, signed into law in September 16, 2011, and effective 
March 16, 2013, Congress first proposed changes that would conform 
to foreign practice and only later added more patriotic, and largely 
symbolic, language. The bill, introduced in the Senate in January 
2011 as the “Patent Reform Act of 2011,” included the key change 
that would bring the United States into alignment with foreign 
practice: the shift from first-to-invent to first-inventor-to-file.
90
 Over 
a month later, the more patriotic title “America Invents Act” was 
proposed and approved.
91
 By June 2011, after the bill had been 
introduced in the House of Representatives, Congress had added two 
“senses of Congress,”92 non-binding provisions indicating a 
viewpoint useful for canon construction.
93
 The first sense of Congress 
reproduced the Copyright/Patent Clause, presumably to promote the 
bill’s constitutionality: 
It is the sense of the Congress that converting the 
United States patent registration system from ‘first 
inventor to use’ to a system of ‘first inventor to file’ 
will promote the progress of science by securing for 
 
88. Id. at 205–06 (“[O]ur Constitution says limited times, but there really isn’t a very 
good indication on what limited times is. The reason why you’re going to life-plus-70 today 
is because Europe has gone that way.” (citing Copyright Term, Film Labeling, and Film 
Preservation Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 989 et al. before the Subcomm. on Courts and 
Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 230 (1995))).  
89. Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. (2011) (as signed by 
President Obama, Sept. 16, 2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
90. Patent Reform Act of 2011, S. 23, 112th Cong. §§ 1(a), 2 (as introduced and referred 
to the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Jan. 25, 2011). 
91. See 157 CONG. REC. S1037, S1050 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2011) (describing Senate 
Amendment 121 to Senate Bill 23, which changed the name of the bill to “America Invents 
Act”). 
92. America Invents Act, H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. §§ 1(a), 3(p), 3(q) (2011) (as reported 
by the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, June 1, 2011). 
93. See YULE KIM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-589, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 33 (2008) (“‘Sense of Congress’ language . . .  
[is] appropriate if Congress wishes to make a statement without making enforceable law.” 
(citing, inter alia, Accardi v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 383 U.S. 225, 229 (1966); State 
Highway Comm’n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099, 1116 (8th Cir. 1973))). 
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limited times to inventors the exclusive rights to their 
discoveries and provide inventors with greater 
certainty regarding the scope of protection granted by 
the exclusive rights to their discoveries.
94
 
The second sense of Congress explicitly cited “harmoniz[ation]” 
and “uniformity” as the basis for the new “first-inventor-to-file” 
system: 
It is the sense of the Congress that converting the 
United States patent registration system from ‘first 
inventor to use’ to a system of ‘first inventor to file’ 
will harmonize the United States patent registration 
system with the patent registration systems commonly 
used in nearly all other countries throughout the world 
with whom the United States conducts trade and 
thereby promote a greater sense of international 
uniformity and certainty in the procedures used for 
securing the exclusive rights of inventors to their 
discoveries.
95
 
Three weeks later, Representative Lamar Smith of Texas offered 
an amendment to the second sense of Congress, simultaneously 
rephrasing the current extent of harmonization while sharpening the 
language about uniformity: 
It is the sense of the Congress that converting the 
United States patent system from “first to invent” to a 
system of “first inventor to file” will improve the 
United States patent system and promote 
harmonization of the United States patent system with 
the patent systems commonly used in nearly all other 
countries throughout the world with whom the United 
States conducts trade and thereby promote greater 
international uniformity and certainty in the 
procedures used for securing the exclusive rights of 
inventors to their discoveries.
96
 
Another amendment, offered on the same day by Representative 
Jackson Lee of Texas, added yet a third sense of Congress, 
 
94. H.R. 1249 § 3(p) (as reported by the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, June 1, 2011). 
95. Id. § 3(q) (emphasis added). 
96. H.R. REP. NO. 112-111, at 8 (2011) (emphasis added to indicate Rep. Smith’s 
amendments to the second sense of Congress). 
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addressing domestic economic concerns in constituent-friendly 
language appropriate to the renamed AIA (which Representative 
Smith offered that day to change to the “Leahy–Smith America 
Invents Act”97): 
SEC. 29. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 
It is the sense of Congress that the patent system 
should promote industries to continue to develop new 
technologies that spur growth and create jobs across 
the country which includes protecting the rights of 
small businesses and inventors from predatory 
behavior that could result in the cutting off of 
innovation.
98
  
These amended senses of Congress remain in the enacted AIA.
99
 
These clauses, presumably intended to provide largely unenforceable 
reassurance to a U.S. audience that harmonization is not necessarily 
Congress’ only goal in reforming the U.S. patent system,100 suggest 
that Congress prioritizes international trade concerns in intellectual 
property legislation. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s holdings in 
Eldred and Golan in effect endorse the viability of expanding 
copyright protection through international agreements to serve 
international trade.
101
 Therefore, even though Congress need not 
currently rely upon the Treaty Clause to alter or refine U.S. copyright 
law, the possibility still exists that the Treaty Clause may be 
harnessed to expand copyright protection further than can be 
contemplated under the already generous interpretation of the 
Copyright Clause.
102
  
 
97. Id. at 7. 
98. Id. at 19. 
99. See Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. §§ 3(o)–(p) (2011) 
(as signed by President Obama, Sept. 16, 2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
35 U.S.C.). 
100. See KIM, supra note 93, at 33 (“In the appropriate context ‘sense of Congress’ 
language can have the same effect as statements of congressional purpose — that of 
resolving ambiguities in more specific language of operative sections of a law — but if that 
is the intent the more straightforward approach is to declare a ‘purpose’ rather than a 
‘sense.’” (citing, inter alia, Accardi v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 383 U.S. 225, 229 (1966); 
State Highway Comm’n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099, 1116 (8th Cir. 1973))). 
101. See supra notes 84–85 and accompanying text. 
102. See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, The Intellectual Property Clause’s External Limitations, 
61 DUKE L.J. 1329, 1385–90 (2012) (discussing the potential interaction between Congress’ 
IP and treaty powers). 
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III. THE COPYRIGHT AND TREATY POWERS IN A POST-GOLAN WORLD: 
PERSPECTIVES AND ANALYSIS 
Given the importance of international agreements to 
contemporary IP legislation, could Congress use its powers under the 
Treaty Clause to pass copyright legislation exceeding the limits of the 
Copyright Clause? The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) 
seemed to think so: in moving to dismiss the case in Golan v. 
Ashcroft, the DOJ, citing Missouri v. Holland
103
 for support, asserted 
that extant case law did not prohibit treaties from “exceed[ing]” the 
limits on Congress’s enumerated powers.”104 By contrast, the 
Supreme Court did not consider this issue when granting certiorari, 
instead ultimately construing the Copyright Clause itself to permit the 
enactment of section 514 of the URAA.
105
 
In the absence of settled law on the relationship between 
Congress’s copyright and treaty powers, I reevaluate one 
commentator’s comprehensive test on the issue in light of Golan v. 
Holder. 
A. Constitutional Context: The Treaty Clause 
In Article II, section 2 of the Constitution, the Treaty Clause 
provides that the President of the United States “shall have Power, by 
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, 
provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.”106 The 
Supremacy Clause in Article VI of the Constitution describes the 
potentially expansive nature of this power by providing that “all 
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the 
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges 
in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution 
or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”107 
In Missouri v. Holland, the Supreme Court held that an Article II 
treaty implemented by Congress “may override [the] power” given to 
 
103. 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
104. See Defendant’s Reply in Further Support of His Motion to Dismiss at 19, Golan v. 
Ashcroft, No. 01-B-1854 (D. Colo. Jan. 16, 2001) (“The treaty-power decisions, which both 
sides cite, hold that treaties cannot negate constitutional prohibitions, such as those contained 
in the Bill of Rights — not that treaties cannot exceed the limits on Congress’s enumerated 
powers.” (emphasis added)).  
105. See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 884 (2012) (“We granted certiorari to consider 
petitioners’ challenge to § 514 under both the Copyright Clause and the First 
Amendment . . . .”). 
106. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
107. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
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a State under the “general terms of the Tenth Amendment,” thus 
allowing Congress to exceed its Article I enumerated powers by 
implementing an Article II treaty.
108
 
Nevertheless, in Reid v. Covert,
109
 the Supreme Court held that 
“no agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on the 
Congress, or on any other branch of Government, which is free from 
the restraints of the Constitution.”110 The Court elaborated that 
There is nothing in [the] language [of Article VI, 
Clause 2] which intimates that treaties and laws 
enacted pursuant to them do not have to comply with 
the provisions of the Constitution . . . . [T]he reason 
treaties were not limited to those made in “pursuance” 
of the Constitution was so that agreements made by 
the United States under the Articles of Confederation, 
including the important peace treaties which 
concluded the Revolutionary War, would remain in 
effect. It would be manifestly contrary to the 
objectives of those who created the Constitution, as 
well as those who were responsible for the Bill of 
Rights—let alone alien to our entire constitutional 
history and tradition—to construe Article VI as 
permitting the United States to exercise power under 
an international agreement without observing 
constitutional prohibitions. In effect, such construction 
would permit amendment of that document in a 
manner not sanctioned by Article V. The prohibitions 
of the Constitution were designed to apply to all 
branches of the National Government and they cannot 
be nullified by the Executive or by the Executive and 
the Senate combined.
111
 
 
 
108. Holland, 252 U.S. at 434. See also Fromer, supra note 102, at 1385–86 (“[E]ven if 
Congress lacks authority to regulate the killing of migratory birds with its Article I, Section 8 
powers—particularly the Commerce Clause—that fact alone does not prohibit the federal 
government from exercising its Article II treatymaking powers to accomplish the same 
effect.”). 
109. 354 U.S. 1 (1957). 
110. Id. at 16. 
111. Id. at 16–17 (emphasis added). 
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B. The Dinwoodie Taxonomy: Theories of Subservience, Expansive 
Autonomy, and Limited Autonomy  
Relatively few commentators have directly addressed the 
relationship between the Treaty Clause and the Copyright Clause. 
One explanation for the relative dearth of scholarship in this area is 
that “any intellectual property regulation that would serve the United 
States’ international interests would be a regulation of foreign 
commerce and therefore could also fall within the commerce power, 
rendering reference to the treaty power superfluous.”112 Such an 
explanation may assume (not necessarily inaccurately) that current 
U.S. policy tends to interpret copyright as commerce, even though 
commerce is not explicitly stated in the purpose of the Copyright 
Clause (which aims “to promote the progress of Science and the 
useful Arts”).113  
Professor Graeme Dinwoodie, in his survey of extant scholarship 
on the relationship between copyright and treaty powers, classifies 
most commentaries on the topic as animated by one of two general 
theories, “subservience theory”114 and “autonomy theory,”115 both of 
which he criticizes.
116
  
Subservience theory argues that the Treaty Clause is subservient 
to the Copyright Clause, and therefore Congress may not enact a 
treaty-implementing statute that exceeds the limits of the Copyright 
Clause.
117
 Subservience theory’s application to copyright derives 
from the more general proposition that constitutional limitations on 
legislative authority (such as the enumeration of congressional 
powers) “would be meaningless if Congress could evade them simply 
by announcing that it was acting under some broader authority.”118 
Dinwoodie characterizes Professors Jaszi, Heald and Sherry, Benkler, 
and Pollack as supporters of subservience theory.
119
 
 
112. Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104 COLUM. L. 
REV. 272, 279 n.18 (2004). 
113. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
114. Dinwoodie, supra note 57, at 395. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. at 361–62. 
117. Id. at 365. 
118. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, A Wiseguy’s Approach to Information Products: 
Muscling Copyright and Patent into a Unitary Theory of Intellectual Property, 1992 SUP. 
CT. REV. 195, 230 (1992). 
119. Dinwoodie, supra note 57, at 366 n.50. See generally Peter Jaszi, Say Goodbye to All 
That—A Reluctant (and Perhaps Premature) Adieu to a Constitutionally-Grounded 
Discourse of Public Interest in Copyright Law, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 595, 608–09 
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Dinwoodie, however, criticizes subservience theory on three 
grounds: first, that its implicit underlying federalist principles do not 
effectively apply to the already federal and international issue of 
copyright;
120
 second, that it is not clear whether the Copyright Clause 
or the Treaty Clause is the more specific law (lex specialis) that 
should therefore trump the more general one (lex generalis);
121
 and 
finally, that the recent shift in U.S. copyright policy from a domestic 
to an international perspective may necessitate a shift in 
constitutional interpretation.
122
 
Autonomy theory, by contrast, argues that the Treaty Clause is 
autonomous, and therefore the treaty power conferred by Article II is 
not to be restricted by the limitations of Article I’s Copyright 
Clause.
123
 Autonomy theory itself encompasses two points of view, 
the “expansive”124 and the “limited.”125 Expansive autonomy theory 
argues that the Treaty Clause grants a far-reaching authority that 
cannot be limited by the scope of an Article I enumerated power.
126
 
For example, Caroline Nguyen opines that limits on the treaty power 
do exist but only restrict violations of “affirmative prohibitions” in 
the Constitution, such as the violation of the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments by the treaty at issue in Reid v. Covert.
127
 
Dinwoodie points out three weaknesses of the expansive 
autonomy theory.
128
 First, the distinction between “affirmative 
prohibitions” and limitations from enumerated powers depends 
overmuch on a simplistic “parsing of syntax” to find either a 
 
(1996); Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The 
Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1119 (2000); Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Bounds of Database Protection: The Role of 
Judicial Review in the Creation and Definition of Private Rights in Information, 15 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535, 538, 600 (2000); Malla Pollack, Unconstitutional 
Incontestability? The Intersection of the Intellectual Property and Commerce Clauses of the 
Constitution: Beyond a Critique of Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp., 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
259 (1995). 
120. Dinwoodie, supra note 57, at 369–72. 
121. Id. at 372–75. 
122. Id. at 375–77. 
123. Id. at 377. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. at 383. 
126. See Caroline T. Nguyen, Expansive Copyright Protection for All Time? Avoiding 
Article I Horizontal Limitations Through the Treaty Power, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1079, 1079 
(2006). 
127. Id. at 1112. 
128. See Dinwoodie, supra note 57, at 379–83. 
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“positive or negative statement.”129 Second, the presumptive political 
checks arising from the differences between Article II international 
treaty-making and Article I domestic lawmaking may not exist 
because the Supreme Court has allowed the treaty power to apply to 
nontraditional processes (such as congressional-executive 
agreements) that resemble too closely “ordinary domestic 
lawmaking.”130 Finally, because treaties historically only applied to 
limited subject matter and because historical deference to the treaty 
power presumably derived from this subject-matter limitation, “the 
theoretical basis for deferential review of treaties has been eroded.”131 
Limited autonomy theory, a minority view, argues that the 
Treaty Clause, though autonomous, is governed by its own internal 
limits, namely, “if the subject matter of the law in question is truly 
international.”132 Dinwoodie downplays this distinction from 
expansive autonomy theory, arguing that the limitedness of limited 
autonomy theory is obviated by the current “integration of domestic 
and international lawmaking.”133 
C. The Dinwoodie Test: International Obligation, Political Process, 
and Copyright Clause Language 
Dinwoodie’s own ultimate assessment of the strength of the 
Treaty Power in relation to the Copyright Clause involves a test of at 
least three factors.
134
 I now apply Dinwoodie’s three primary factors 
to the post-Golan U.S. copyright landscape to evaluate which of them 
might favor the Copyright Clause over the Treaty Clause. 
 The first major factor would have courts evaluate the “strength 
of the international obligation,” whereby “Treaty Clause-grounded 
laws should be most constitutionally favored when seeking to ensure 
domestic compliance with real international obligations.”135 In this 
post-Golan world, Congress’s international copyright obligations are 
arguably very “real” because TRIPS is scrupulously enforced by a 
disciplinary body
136
 and because Eldred and Golan legitimize 
 
129. Id. at 380. 
130. Id. at 381–82. 
131. Id. at 383. 
132. Id. at 383–84 (citing Timothy R. Holbrook, The Treaty Power and the Patent Clause: 
Are There Limits on the United States’ Ability to Harmonize?, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.  
L.J. 1, 41 (2004)). 
133. Id. at 384. 
134. Id. at 363. 
135. Id. 
136. See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text. 
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Congress’s reliance on foreign and international copyright 
standards.
137 
 
The second major factor would have courts evaluate the 
“political process by which international norms are adopted and 
expressed in U.S. law . . . giv[ing] more latitude to a law adopted 
through a process involving real political checks on legislative 
lawmaking [such as] formal multilateral treaty-making” and 
“rais[ing] the level of judicial scrutiny” when faced with “alternative 
processes.”138 By this reasoning, then, courts should give less latitude 
to the URAA because it is a congressional–executive agreement 
rather than a “formal multilateral [Article II] treaty” and was adopted 
through an “alternative” fast-track process involving fewer “real 
political checks.”139 
Applying the second Dinwoodie factor in a post-Golan world, 
then, might seem to provide a promising way to prevent Congress 
from using the Article II treaty power as a means to circumvent the 
Copyright Clause—namely, disqualifying congressional–executive 
agreements such as the URAA (to which TRIPS is annexed) from 
serving as a source for that treaty power.
140
 
Although Reid held that constitutional prohibitions could not be 
overridden “by the Executive or by the Executive and the Senate 
combined,” the case did not expressly mention congressional–
executive agreements, which require participation not only by the 
President and the Senate but also by the House of Representatives.
141
 
From a historical standpoint, the Article II treaty power would not 
necessarily apply to all international agreements, although to what 
extent this power applies is not always clear. As Professor Laurence 
Tribe points out, “the Constitution expressly recognizes different 
categories of international agreements, some called ‘treaties,’ and 
some called ‘agreements’ or ‘compacts’ . . . . What the Founders saw 
as the precise definitions of treaties, alliances, confederations, 
agreements, and compacts is largely lost to us now.”142 
 
137. See supra notes 85–88 and accompanying text. 
138. Dinwoodie, supra note 57, at 363. 
139. See id. 
140. See id. 
141. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1957) (emphasis added). 
142. Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form 
Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1265–66 (1995). 
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The URAA was not passed as an Article II treaty—that is, a 
treaty made by the U.S. president and requiring approval by at least 
two-thirds of the Senate.
143
 Rather, as an international trade 
agreement, the URAA was negotiable—and ultimately negotiated—
as a congressional–executive agreement144 ratifiable by a mere 
majority of both houses of Congress.
145
 Moreover, President Clinton 
submitted the URAA bill to Congress in a “fast track procedure” that 
“discharge[d] automatically the proposed legislation from committee 
within a certain number of days, [barred] amendments to the 
proposal, and [limited] floor debate.”146 This fast-track procedure, 
created by Congress in the Trade Act of 1974,
147
 had been 
specifically extended to accommodate the Uruguay Round 
negotiations of the GATT.
148
 Thus, as stated above, under the second 
factor of the Dinwoodie test, an international agreement less formal 
than an Article II treaty and implemented with fewer checks and 
balances than normal would receive stricter judicial scrutiny.
149
  
Moreover, other scholars assert, on similar grounds, that the 
URAA does not confer the Article II treaty power upon Congress. 
For example, Jaszi, acknowledging Congress’s treaty-implementation 
power under Missouri v. Holland,
150
 warned opponents of copyright 
expansion of the possibility that Congress might create “quasi-
copyrights . . . enacted under a source of constitutional authority 
other than the Patent and Copyright Clause.”151 Nevertheless, he 
asserted (though with respect to bootlegging, not copyright 
restoration) that such power would not apply to the URAA because 
 
143. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. For the rationale underlying this multiplicity of 
agreement types, see THOMAS JEFFERSON, Report of the Secretary of State to the President, 
in THE JEFFERSONIAN CYCLOPEDIA 879–80 (John P. Foley ed., 1900) (“It is desirable, in 
many instances, to exchange mutual advantages by Legislative Acts rather than by treaty: 
because the former, though understood to be in consideration of each other, and therefore 
greatly respected, yet when they become too inconvenient, can be dropped at the will of 
either party: whereas stipulations by treaty are forever irrevocable but by joint 
consent . . . . ”). 
144. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 106TH CONG., TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL 
AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE U.S. SENATE 5 (Comm. Print 2001). 
145. See id. at 25. 
146. Cindy G. Buys & William Isasi, An “Authoritative” Statement of Administrative 
Action: A Useful Political Invention or A Violation of the Separation of Powers Doctrine?, 7 
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 73, 77–78 (2004). 
147. 19 U.S.C. § 2902(e)(3), § 2903 (2006) (application of implementing and “fast track” 
procedures). 
148. Id. § 2902(e)(1). 
149. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
150. See Jaszi, supra note 119, at 602 n.19. 
151. Id. at 602–03. 
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the URAA is “not a treaty, and was never presented to the U.S. 
Senate for ratification.”152 In addition, Professor Jeanne Fromer 
argues that the Copyright Clause “externally limits the government’s 
power to enact treaty-like congressional–executive agreements” such 
as TRIPS (and, by extension, the URAA) because such bicameral 
agreements are enacted under Article I, section 8 of the Constitution 
and are therefore “subject to Article I’s limitations, even when 
Article II treaties are not.”153 
Nevertheless, although TRIPS might be disqualified as a source 
of congressional power to expand the scope of U.S. copyright law, it 
is possible that Congress—aware of the potential difficulty of 
asserting its Article II treaty power under a congressional–executive 
agreement such as the URAA or TRIPS—might instead assert its 
power under the Berne Convention, which is a non-self-executing 
treaty ratified by the Senate.
154
 Although Fromer, for example, has 
tentatively posited an argument whereby the Berne Convention’s 
non-self-executing status might render it limited by the Copyright 
Clause, she also acknowledges the probable impracticality of such a 
theory: 
[E]ven if Article II self-executing treaties are not 
limited externally by the IP Clause, non-self-executing 
treaties [such as the Berne Convention] might be so 
limited. Although both kinds of treaties are made 
pursuant to Article II, the former become law without 
any need for Congress to activate them via Article I, 
whereas the latter come into effect only if Congress 
uses Article I’s Necessary and Proper Clause to enact 
appropriate legislation. Therefore, one might argue 
that whenever Congress uses its Article I powers to 
implement non-self-executing treaties—the only 
powers it has at its disposal to do so—the IP Clause 
externally limits the legislature to the [IP] Clause’s 
specified means . . . . This argument for different 
treatment, however, is weak, primarily because of the 
strange state of affairs that would result if Article II 
were to allow the United States to take on a treaty 
 
152. Id. at 602. 
153. Fromer, supra note 102, at 1388–89 (2012). 
154. See BCIA, supra note 36, § 2 (“The [Berne] Convention . . . and all acts, protocols, 
and revisions thereto . . . are not self-executing under the Constitution and laws of the United 
States.”). 
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obligation that it could not then implement via 
Article I.
155
 
The third major factor would have courts more strictly construe 
the “limited times” language of the Copyright Clause than the 
Progress Clause because measuring the Progress Clause’s incentive 
“implicates harder and more uncertain policy choices.”156 It is true 
that neither the Berne Convention nor TRIPS affirmatively give 
Congress the power to declare perpetual copyright in the United 
States; rather, by providing only a floor, they merely prohibit a term 
shorter than this minimum. Nevertheless, this particular 
recommendation by Dinwoodie might not be strictly followed in a 
post-Golan world because, even if a court gives more weight to 
“limited times” than to incentivizing creation or dissemination, that 
court must still contend with the vague dictionary definition of 
“limited” relied on in both Eldred and Golan: “confine[d] within 
certain bounds,” “restrain[ed],” or “circumscribe[d].”157 In light of 
the copyright-expansion trend reinforced by Eldred and Golan, it 
seems unlikely that the limitation of “limited times” would 
substantially restrain the expansion of the scope of U.S. copyright.
158
 
CONCLUSION 
As international agreements increasingly influence the scope of 
U.S. intellectual property law in general and copyright law in 
particular, scholars debate to what extent the Treaty Clause might 
supplement or supersede the Copyright Clause as a source of 
Congress’ power over copyrights.159  
The Supreme Court’s most recent copyright decision in Golan v. 
Holder expanded the scope of copyright protection in the United 
States under the Copyright Clause while leaving the Treaty Clause 
untouched.
160
 Nevertheless, although the Golan opinion avoided 
explicitly addressing the Treaty Clause issue, the Supreme Court did 
find constitutional the restoration of U.S. copyright recognition to 
certain works as part of the United States’ accession to the WTO and, 
 
155. Fromer, supra note 102, at 1388. 
156. Dinwoodie, supra note 57, at 363. 
157. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 884–85 (quoting Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 
199 (2003)). 
158. See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text. 
159. See supra Part III.B.  
160. See supra Part I.B. 
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by extension, TRIPS and the Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works. Therefore, the Court in effect—and not 
for the first time—endorsed the viability of expanding copyright 
protection through international agreements to serve international 
trade.
161
 
This attitude may bolster Congress’s existing tendency to 
prioritize international trade concerns in intellectual-property 
legislation, as in the misleadingly titled America Invents Act, which 
reformed patent law to harmonize with international norms.
162
 
Therefore, even though Congress need not currently rely upon the 
Treaty Clause to alter or refine U.S. copyright law, the possibility still 
exists that the Treaty Clause may be harnessed to expand copyright 
protection further than can be contemplated under the already 
generous interpretation of the Copyright Clause.
163
 
Professor Dinwoodie has provided a useful taxonomy of diverse 
scholarly viewpoints on this issue.
164
 In addition, as an alternative to 
arguing simply for one clause to trump the other, he has created a 
flexible test that emphasizes three factors—international obligation, 
political process, and constitutional language—in determining 
whether the Copyright Clause or the Treaty Clause should prevail in 
a given situation.
165
 Nevertheless, although the Dinwoodie test might 
have allowed for greater flexibility in case-specific determinations at 
the time it was first published, the precedents set or reinforced by 
Golan v. Holder now suggest that this test today could not strongly 
support an argument that the Copyright Clause should limit the 
Treaty Clause.
166
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